






Three Union Regulations for Environment Protection Agency 
or 
A Game with 12 bank notes by Joseph E. Mullat, Independent Researcher 
August 27, 2005 
Personage: Protection Agency, Environment Board, Union Members/Outsiders and Moderator 
It is now almost a common truth that society needs to avoid environment contami-
nation or damage become significant for nature protection programs of the govern-
ment and wild life preservation efforts. A possible outcome of such efforts might  
occasionally be a voluntary solution, which results that some industries are keyed up 
to find a break not to participate in environment protection. In the following we blow 
things out of all proportions, but the reader may found it informative to trace the  
interaction of interests between companies and environment protection agency, which 
takes into account the nature/content of industry activities. Contrary to the efficiency 
of a voluntary solution, what our solution is not, we still hope that we are at right  
advancing in the direction of self-governing decision-making process. 
Suppose, that environment protection agency is determined to supervise contaminat-
ing activities. The agency hopes to reduce society losses with regard to wasted natural 
resources. To find industry pollution activities the agency has recommended proceed-
ing with an inspection. Inspection disclosed that companies out of the normal activi-















 Comp. nr.1    ○  ○     2 
 Comp. nr.2  ○  ○  ○  ○  4 
 Comp. nr.3    ○  ○  ○   3 
 Comp. nr.4  ○  ○  ○  ○  4 
 Comp. nr.5     ○  ○   2 
 Comp. nr.6  ○  ○  ○  ○  ○  5 
 Comp. nr.7    ○  ○     2 
 Total  3 6  5  5  3  22 
The agency asked the companies to close these activities and they promised to start 
projects to shut down the contamination or to downgrade the industry negative effects 
of all ○-activities and to live up totally to 22 promises. The agency believes the com-






list in the follow-up inspection as closed or contained ⊗-activities. In addition, agency 
explained that all are free to self-govern or to broke their promises without any penal-
ties. Nevertheless, the agency is aware about companies’ unreliable nature in keeping 
to their promises. Therefore, the agency decides to award companies, which do not 
damage or contaminate the environment and projected to organize them into a union 
of “Environment Protection”. Agency established a fund for awards payoffs, max 12 
bank notes, to cover the awards expenses. But, for some reason, the account of   
follow-up inspections as to fulfill promises is under budget constraint 4 = , while the 
inspection of a particular damaging activity has its firm price per activity 1 = .  
The first rule in force will be to award a company by a bank note which will not 
broke its promises to close the contamination or to reduce the damage effect at least at 
k  activities among all ○-activities in the row of the Table 1. The agency decided not 
inform in advance how many ⊗-activities will be actually chosen in the award deci-
sion k . This secret, the agency thinks, will be rather more than less encouraging over 
rational companies to keep to their promises. However, the agency thinks, that to pre-
serve the effectiveness of the project, despite the budget constraint for the inspection, 
it will be acceptable to circumvent inspection of some activities (columns) with only 
few ⊗-promises fulfilled. For this reason to act as the agency desired, i.e. to diminish 
inspection expenses, by the second rule in force, a moderator of the union will be 
awarded personally depending on the following rule. The award basket of moderator 
will be equal to the lowest number of promises fulfilled by the union members among 
activities in columns of Table 1 with regard to union members only. Moreover, to  
encourage a collective responsibility as coming members of the union not to “spring 
off in the long run” out of promises the agency proposed the third rule in force that 
the coming union regulation must emanate a threat: all awards, inclusive moderator’s 
personal award, will be lost if some union member does not keep to its promises – still 
living up less than to k  promises in the follow-up inspection. Note, that if no one of 
union members’ keeps to a promise, an outsider might keep to a promise staying away 
from contaminating activities, as the outsider promised in the past. These promises 






Let us look more closely at the incentives of moderator and union members with  
regard to the awards. It is clear, as we already noticed, that highly rational companies 
would try to shut down or contain rather more than fewer activities from the list as 
they promised in order to reduce the risk not to be awarded with a higher k -decision. 
So, the members of the coming union (members with higher environment protection 
standards) will certainly count on higher k ’s and therefore they will try to prevent 
outsiders – those with relatively low “protection standards” – having relatively lower 
k ’s – to become the members of the union. Mind that all members and the moderator 
personally will loose the awards if a union member in the long run intends to broke 
too many ⊗-promises, i.e. to fulfill less than k  promises. On the other hand, the  
personal award basket of moderator might be quite empty if the number k  is   
relatively high. Below we illustrate the last statement by example. 
Let us take a look at the Table 1 and let the award will be granted at  2 or    1 = k . The 
agency expects that by fulfilling promises to close down all ○-activities in Table 1 (all 
22 ○-activities turn into 22 ⊗-activities) every company will become a member of 
the union: the most preferable solution by other means, f. e. voluntary. Indeed, each  
company is to be awarded by a bank note. Nevertheless, the agency cannot afford the 
project due to budget constraint: expenses of follow-up inspection equal 5, i.e. exceed 
the budget by 1. The moderator’s basket size equals to 3. On the other hand the  
moderator may persuade the coming members of the union not to keep to their   
promises at “Groundwater Contamination” and “Ozone Depletion” activities. All   
union members will still preserve their well-earned awards sounds the argument of 
moderator. This solution, as everyone can see, is in the interests of both: The modera-
tor award increases from 3 to 5, and the agency expenses on inspection drop from 5 
to  3; only 3 activities have to be inspected instead of 5, see the Table 2 below, in 
compliance with the budget constraint 4 = . 




of Lakes  
Fuel  
Damage 
Loss of  
Forest Cover
Total   Deterioration 
of Lakes 
Total
 Comp. nr.1  ⊗  ⊗   2    ⊗ 1 
 Comp. nr.2  ⊗  ⊗ 2    ⊗ 1 
 Comp. nr.3  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 3    ⊗ 1 
 Comp. nr.4  ⊗  ⊗ 2    ⊗ 1 
 Comp. nr.5    ⊗  ⊗ 2    0 
 Comp. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 3    ⊗ 1 
 Comp. nr.7  ⊗  ⊗   2    ⊗ 1 






One can also notice that the total award expenses may now rise up to maximum 12 
bank notes. However, someone from the environment board may insist that the   
proposal to vote for  1 = k  is undesirable from an additional intersection since the 
moderator can misrepresent the members’ preferences. Indeed, by this motion the 
moderator may offer one bank note to an environment board member for signaling 
about the decision  1 = k . Now, the moderator by knowing  1 = k  may propose to the 
union members not to live up to all activities except one – the “Deterioration of 
Lakes”. With this regard, the moderator may compensate nr.5 company losses by one 
bank note
1. If not, the company nr.5 is at right to receive an award since it may keep 
to promises to stay away from activities other than “Deterioration of Lakes”, and 
therefore the company nr.5 may threaten to send a signal to the board regarding the 
moderator’s fraud. Moderator’s award in this case, following the regulation rules in 
force (see Table 3), will be 6  minus 1 for the signal, and minus 1 for the compensa-
tion. That makes 4 what is greater than 3, as the Table 1 suggests. Thus, the board 
may follow the line of reasoning for counter argument to the proposal  1 = k  and to 
insist on the decision  3 ≥ k  in order to prevent moderator’s misrepresentation (fraud). 
One may argue that  3 ≥ k  yields a grater effect of environment contamination   
because undesirable activities of companies’ nr.  5 3 1 , ,  and 7 is now irrelevant. These 
companies will be excluded from the union of “Environment Protection” and will be 
free to self-govern, i.e. to break or not the promises (without any penalties as we  
already know) regarding their resumption of all these contaminating activities once 
again. However, someone may counter argue that, if the exclusion of companies’ 
nr.  5 3 1 , ,  and 7 happens, as anyone can see from the Table 4 below, the remaining 
companies  4 2,  and 6  will still be awarded and will still downgrade the total   















 Comp. nr.2  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Comp. nr.4  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Comp. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 5 
 Total  3 3  1  3  3  13 
                                                           






Now the award basket of moderator equals 1, since the company nr.6  alone prefers 
to live up to shut down the “Fuel Damage” activity. The awards expenses will   
decrease from 10 to 4. However, the agency may compromise with the moderator to 
increase his award to 3, excluding “Fuel Damage” from the Table 4 inspection list, 
since the inspection of “Fuel Damage” with only one company nr.6 exceeds the 
budget by 1 anyway. Note that the total expenses for awards rise now once again to 
6 , see Table 5, c.f. the suggestion above not to live up to close or to contain the 













 Comp. nr.2  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Comp. nr.4  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Comp. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 4 
 Total  3 3  3  3  12 
Is this decision rational? Suppose not, and let  5 = k  is the board proposal. Now, only 















 Comp. nr.6  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 5 
 Total  1 1  1  1  1  5 
The moderator may disagree to organize an “Environment Protection” union, be-
cause his award is only one bank note. From the other side, it is not exactly the motive 
of agency either to exceed the budget amount on inspection to inspect all 5 activities 
with only one potential company in keeping to its promises. The agency decides to 
vote against  5 = k  proposal at the environment board. Our game ends here and we do 
not tell the whole truth what was the decision at the company’s board. 
2 
To reach a conclusion, the basic nature of agency’s difficulty to make a decision lies 
in between to pick up a row in the following table: 
                                                           





















Table 1  7 3  0  0  10  2  5 
Table 2  7 5  0  0  12  0  3 
Table 3  6 4  1  1  12  0  1 
Table 4  3 1  0  0  4  8  5 
Table 5  3 3  0  0  6  6  4 
Table 6  1 1  0  0  2  10  5 
Below we visualize the agency difficulty by a bargaining game to share 12 bank 
notes between the bargainers: (i) – The members of “Environment Protection” union 
of and (ii) – the moderator of the union. 
 
So, a final topic is necessary to conclude our pleasant story
3. Let three actors have 
been engaged in our interaction: companies N , moderator in charge off union forma-
tion and the agency accountable for society well-being. Certain companies 
{} n ,... i ,..., N 1 =  – the coming members of the union  x, 
N x 2 ∈ , have expressed their 
willingness to live up to promises as to shut down or contain particular contaminating 
activities  {} m ,..., j ,..., M 1 =  in follow-up inspection list. Companies’ N  preferences 
lists, as pre-orderings
4  i P ,  N i∈ , be given towards numbers  {} max k ,..., k ,..., A 1 = . For  
example,  5 4, Pjm = , further some numbers  5 > k  indifferently in which order, but 
the list ends always as  1 2 3 , , . Let a table 
m
n ij a W =  reflects the inspection result of 
companies participating in protection programs;  1 = ij a  if company i fulfilled its 
promise to shut down the contamination or damaging activity  j ,  0 = ij a  if not.   
                                                           
3 This time we have to jump into rigorous issue. 


























Characteristic functions  ) x (
k ν ,  A k ∈ , supermodular
5 on  N  are known for the coali-
tion game; for every pair  G L ⊂ , 
N G , L 2 ∈ , it holds that  ) G ( ) L (
k k ν ν ≤ . Also lists 
M 2  of allegedly inspected activities 
M y 2 ∈  have been examined. We can calculate 
the moderator payoff  ) H ( Fk  using a subtable H  on crossing entries of the rows x 
and columns  y  in the original table W . By further selection of a column with the 
smallest amount number  ) H ( Fk  from the list  y  the payoff  ) H ( Fk  is determined by 
the number of 1-entries in each column in  y . One might find that it not too difficult to 
imagine the agency gain as an advantage function  ) H ( fk  for the society contributing 
into protection programs. Agency expenses are equal to  () ( ) [ ] H F x k
k + − ν . 
We propose, in conclusion, some ideas for reasonable solution of our game. The 
situation is similar to the Nash Bargaining Problem from 1950, where two rational 
partners (players’ Nr.1 and 2, union members and the moderator/agency) try to find a 
fear agreement. It is possible to find the Bargaining Solution for each particular 
choice of the number k , see Mullat 2001. However, the number k  choice is itself 
somewhat different. We have pointed out earlier that the choice  5 , 4 k =  may be useful 
from some ex-ante reasoning. Maximum payoffs are guaranteed for players nr.1-2 
when the choice  1 k = . Counting on that decision is irrational, because here only one 
contaminating activity will be shut down with the maximum number of participants 
but without significant effect on environment protection. The choice of higher k  
numbers is either counterproductive due to constraint of follow-up of inspections – a 
lot of different protection activities will be at hand, but with lower number of   
participants, what is rational only for the agency if preserving awards/payoffs assets. 
For example, for  max k k =  a company with the largest list of preferred  max k  promises 
fulfilled as to shut down contamination activities might become the only member of 
the union. As it seems to us the situation is like a median voter scheme, see Barbera 
et. al., 1993. However, a consultation in this “white field” is necessary, because a  
difficulty is well known following the classic result of Gibbard (1973) and   
Satterhwaite (1975) theorem to meet both the individual and collective rationality  
objectives on “unrestricted domain”. 
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5 Function  ) x ( v  is supermodular if   ) G ( v ) L ( v ) G L ( v ) G L ( v + ≥ ∩ + ∪  for every pair 
N G , L 2 ∈ . 
Cherenin was the first who introduced supermodular functions.  